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INTRODUCTION
The concept of obligations on developed countries
relating to the transfer of technologies for
environmental protection under international law came
into being with the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.
Principle 21 of that declaration stated that
‘environmental technologies should be made available
to developing countries on terms which would
encourage their wide dissemination without
constituting an economic burden on the developing
countries’.1 The next decade saw technology transfer
become a central pillar of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987, with
developing countries demanding technology transfer
‘as a condition of participation in the control measures
of the Montreal Protocol’.2 In common with other
multilateral environmental agreements, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
in 1992 (hereafter the UNFCCC)3 also contains
provisions pertaining to technology transfer. Since then,
there has been increasing recognition of the importance
of technology transfer as a hugely influential process
in the global efforts to address environmental
challenges. In 2005, a UN report from the Department
of Economic and Social Affairs on sustainable forest
management claimed that ‘Policies promoting
development and diffusion of technologies are
probably among the most important factors affecting
environmental protection. Moreover, technology
transfer is one of the major factors shaping global
income distribution’.4 The centrality of technology
transfer to international efforts towards environmental
protection was further illustrated in 2007, when
Anderson et al, found that of the nearly 270
environmental treaties extant at that time
‘development, commercialisation and transfer of
environmentally sound technologies are the crux of
these treaties...’5
Increasing recognition and acceptance of the scale of
the global threat posed by climate change has focussed
international attention on the UNFCCC as the
framework for interventions to limit climate change
and adapt to its impacts on the human environment.
As a result, the technology transfer provisions agreed
under this convention are of significant international
interest. Indeed, the transfer of technologies which
may mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) production in
an attempt to limit climate change, or which are
designed to aid the most vulnerable nation states in
adapting to the effects of such change, is one of the
central pillars of the Convention.  Article 4 of the
Convention sets out the commitments of the parties,
and Art.4.1.(c) obliges parties to ‘Promote and
cooperate in the development, application and
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices
and processes that control, reduce or prevent
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant
sectors, including the energy, transport, industry,
agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors’.
Art 4.5. of the convention explicitly recognises the
differentiated responsibility of the developed and
developing parties and inter alia, requires the developed
parties proactively to promote, finance and transfer
environmentally sound technologies to developing
states.
The ways in which the parties to the Convention may
co-operate to give effect to the terms of these
provisions have developed over time, and have been
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1 P3 Stockholm Declaration (1972)  <https://
www.soas.ac.uk/cedep-demos/000_P514_IEL_K3736-
D e m o / t r e a t i e s / m e d i a / 1 9 7 2 % 2 0 S t o c k h o l m
% 2 0 1 9 7 2 % 2 0 - % 2 0 D e c l a r a t i o n % 2 0 o f % 2 0 t h e
% 2 0 U n i t e d % 2 0 N a t i o n s % 2 0 C o n f e r e n c e
%20on%20the%20Human%20Envi ronment%20-
%20UNEP.pdf>.
2 S Anderson, K Sarma and K Taddonio, Technology Transfer
for the Ozone Layer : Lessons for Climate Change  (Earthscan
2007) 5.
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (1992) <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
conveng.pdf>.
4 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United
Nations Forum on Forests Secretariat, ‘Transfer of
Environmentally Sound Technologies for Sustainable
Forest Management – Framework and Applications’,
December 2005, [hereafter the DESA Report] https://
www.un.org/esa/forests/wp-content/uploads/2015/
06/tests1205.pdf.
5 Anderson, Sarma and Taddonio (n 2)1.
articulated in greater detail through successive
Conferences of the Parties (COPs),6 and leading,
amongst other technology initiatives, to Decisions on
the Technology Mechanism, taken at the Cancun and
Durban COPs.7 The aim of  the Technology
Mechanism is to facilitate the implementation of
enhanced action on technology development and
transfer. Activities under this mechanism have, in turn,
led to the establishment of  a Climate Technology
Centre and Network (CTCN),8 the aim of which is
essentially to assist developing countries in identifying
their needs with respect to climate change related
technologies, and via co-development or transfer, to
allow them to successfully adopt such technologies,
thereby helping such countries to mitigate or adapt to
climate change to the maximum extent that
technological solutions allow. The Technology
Mechanism comprises the CTCN and the Technology
Executive Committee, with the latter analysing and
formulating policy interventions whilst the CTCN is
the operational am of  the Technology Mechanism,
responsible for fostering climate technology
development and transfer.9 Whilst other mechanisms
under the UNFCCC such as the Clean Development
Mechanism, have the potential to effect climate
technology transfers, there is much debate about how
effective this has been, with evidence putting the
percentage of projects resulting in such transfers being
as low as 12 per cent in some countries.10
The transfer of a technology from one actor to another
might seem on first consideration to be a simple task,
begging the question of  why such entities as the CTCN
and associated interventions should be necessary.
Given that free market economics are the dominant
force in the majority of global economies,11 providing
appropriate funding is made available to poorer
countries, should the willing seller/willing buyer
principle not enable them to meet their technological
needs without recourse to such intermediary
organisations? Regrettably, the reality is far from being
this simple. The area of technology transfer, particularly
where some of the technologies required are yet to be
developed or at least customised for the recipient, is a
hugely complex field of  activity. There are many factors
contributing to this complexity, such as the nature of
the technology – climate related technologies can range
from environmentally cleaner cooking stoves costing
a few tens of dollars, to hydroelectric dam installations
costing in excess of a billion dollars. Some
‘technologies’ are more appropriately termed as
‘practices’, such as sustainable forestry management
practice, and are in the public domain, whilst others,
such as genetically modified seeds are largely private
sector property and heavily IP protected. Some
technologies may be completely new to the recipient
market, presenting barriers of market education and
creation, whilst other may need to displace less
environmentally friendly alternatives that enjoy existing
subsidies. There are also issues of standards, reliability
in use, skills required by end users, maintenance costs
and availability of spare parts, as well as connectivity
to existing infrastructure where appropriate, or
investment needed in new associated infrastructure in
other instances. The list goes on, and many laudable
endeavours have been made to examine the array of
barriers to effective international technology transfer
and the types of  interventions which may help to
overcome them.12 The CTCN represents one such
intervention, and is the result of  the conduct of  such
assessments under the auspices of the UNFCCC.
The aim of this paper is to inform readers on the
status of implementation of the CTCN and to
provide insights into the degree to which the selected
Implementing the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism
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6 The most comprehensive document in this regard is
that ‘Framework for meaningful and effective actions
to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph
5, of the Convention’ FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1.
7 Decision 1/CP.16, paras 133-129  <https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=18>.
8 See <http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_
cms_page?TEM_tcn>.
9 Technology Mechanism – Enhancing climate technology
development and transfer available at https://unfccc.int/
t tc lear/misc_/Stat icFi les/gnwoerk_stat ic/TEM/
0 e 7 c c 2 5 f 3 f 9 8 4 3 c c b 9 8 3 9 9 d f 4 d 4 7 e 2 1 9 /
174ad939936746b6bfad76e30a324e78.pdf.
10 The Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2009)
Promoting Development, Saving the Planet: World
Economic and Social Survey 2009, New York <https://
www.un.org/en/development/desa/pol icy/wess/
wess_archive/2009wess.pdf> 138.
11 As evidenced by a market freedom ranking of over 50
per cent in the 2019 global Index of Economic Freedom
available from <https://www.heritage.org/index/
ranking>.
12 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special
Report ‘Methodological and Technological Issues in
Technology Transfer’ (2000) ISBN92-9169-112-7.
mechanism addresses the known challenges and
reflects lessons learned from previous work in the field
of international technology transfer by international
organisations ie the extent to which it is able to turn
available knowledge into best practice. After an initial
review of implementation status, ‘Progress’, the
findings will be used to examine how well the
operationalisation of the CTCN has addressed
previously identified barriers to successful technology
transfer under multilateral environmental agreements,
namely the ‘Practicalities’ of implementation,
‘Prioritisation’ of objectives, recognition of technology
or country specific ‘Pathways’ in technology transfer
and the involvement of the ‘Private sector’ – hence
the ‘Five P’s’
2
PROGRESS: IMPLEMENTING THE
UNFCCC CTCN
The CTCN was initiated via a call for proposals from
organisations wishing to establish and deliver the
objectives of  the new entity, in response to which bids
from nine organisations and consortia were received.13
After initial review the three top ranked bids, from a
UNEP led consortium, GEF and Det Norske Veritas,
were subject to a detailed and admirably transparent
and well documented evaluation, against published
assessment criteria. Details of the shortlist assessment
were also published14 and the chosen bid was from
within the United Nations family, specifically a joint
bid led by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).15 The Climate Technology
Centre, that is the Hub of the Network (CTCN), was
subsequently established in Copenhagen, to co-
ordinate with the National Designated Entities
(NDE’s) from the state parties to the UNFCCC, as
well as with other organisations from the private, public,
or third sectors, wishing to contribute to the working
of  the CTCN. The CTCN became operational at the
end of 2013 and was subject to an independent review
of its initial performance in 2017 commissioned by
the UNFCCC Secretariat (hereafter the ‘UNFCCC
Review’), the outcome of which was presented at
COP23 in November 2017.16 This was the first
comprehensive review, as a previous review requested
by the European Commission and conducted
substantially by the UNEP Evaluation Office had only
reviewed the CTCN as a Case Study as part of a broader
evaluation of the CTCN host organisation (hereafter
the ‘UNEP Review’).17 The conclusions reached by
Ernst and Young, the reviewers chosen to undertake
the UNFCCC Review 18, were substantially positive,
and three of their main findings were as follows:
• ‘The beneficiaries have shown satisfaction
regarding the services provided by the CTCN.
Interviewees and survey respondents have
acknowledged the value added by the CTCN,
which is mainly due to the scope of technical
assistance it provides and the time frame
under which it operates. The CTCN fostered
synergies with financial institutions and
technical partners to avoid redundancy and
leverage the impacts of its technical assistance;
• Overall, UNEP, UNIDO and the consortium
partners have effectively implemented
successive COP decisions and set up the
CTCN accordingly, allowing it to respond
effectively to the COP mandate and grow as
a recognized institution, acting in a niche of
the global climate support ecosystem. The
CTCN has consistently adapted the
prioritization of  its services depending on
its financial resources and revised its work
programme to implement successive COP
decisions;
• The operationalization of the CTCN took
time but resulted in the establishment of a
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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13 ‘Matters Relating to the CTCN: Selection of the Host
and Constitution of the Advisory Board’ FCCC/SBI/
2012/L.18 para 2.
14 ‘Report on the Evaluation of Proposals for Hosting the
Climate Technology Centre’ FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.4
paras 18-47.
15 ibid Annex 2 para 2.
16 ‘Report on the Independent Review of the Effective
Implementation of  the Climate Technology Centre and
Network’ FCCC/CP/2017/3.
17 Evaluation Case Study of the CTCN 2016 <https://
www.ctc-n.org/resources/evaluation-case-study-ctcn-
2016>.
18 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16) para 3.
quite efficient organization. The consortium
provides a good mix of core and regional
expertise, as well as knowledge of United
Nations procedures, which have ensured the
application of COP decisions and facilitated
the deployment of  CTCN services’.19
These findings confirm the results of the earlier UNEP
Review which found that ‘an effective, efficient and
responsive CTC has been established’.20 The UNFCCC
Review was followed by the so-called ‘DANIDA
Review’ of 2018 commissioned by the Danish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (as Copenhagen is the host location
of the CTC in UN City). This review was explicitly
based on the two earlier reviews and declared itself to
be ‘in general agreement with the findings’ of those
evaluations.21
Before proceeding with further findings, it is worth
noting at this point that whilst these statements are
positive about the early operations of  the CTCN, there
is an interesting choice of words in the second bullet
point above, namely that the CTCN is ‘acting in a
niche of the global climate support ecosystem’. Given
the strength of the statements quoted at the start of
this article about the importance and centrality of
technology transfer in tackling global challenges such
as climate change, can it really be the intention of the
UN that the CTCN should be viewed as a mere ‘niche’
component within the broader range of mechanisms
seeking to mitigate or adapt to climate change?
That question may be answered indirectly by the
UNFCCC reviewer’s observations regarding the level
and security of funding provided to support the
operations of  the CTCN, effectively citing it as a barrier
to more effective achievement of its objectives. They
state that ‘The funding model and consequent limited
availability of funding for the CTCN prevents it from
delivering services at the expected level. Better
predictability and security over financial resources will
ensure that the CTCN can continue to successfully
respond to its COP mandate and the needs and
expectations of developing countries’22 Referring to
funding as ‘limited’ is diplomatic; the actual level of
funding received from voluntary contributions over
the operating period 2013-2016 was $38,470,000
(excluding cash and in kind contributions from
consortium partners).23 To put this in context, the
amount of funding over the start up and first three
years of operation of a mechanism intended to make
a contribution of scale to a global challenge, attracted
less than half the money from the entire developed
world than was  spent on building a new art gallery in
Dundee.24 Readers in countries with developed
economies are invited to take a moment to think how
similar, or even much larger sums are spent locally to
them in new buildings, regional economic
development schemes or local transport initiatives
before reflecting on how realistic it is to expect this
level of funding to support activities intended to
meaningfully impact climate change. A new cycle path
in Cornwall, for example, is attracting a £27 million
cash injection from Highways England25 and yet the
world can muster barely more than this to support
the operation of what should be a major mechanism
for achieving climate change mitigation and adaptation
measures. Add to this the fact that even this level of
funding is insecure, it becomes yet harder to see that
the CTCN is viewed, as the reviewer indicated, as
anything more than a ‘niche’ component of the climate
change intervention landscape. This level of  funding
must therefore be challenged and changed if technology
transfer via the Technology Mechanism is to be a
significant contributor to the efforts needed to achieve
the limitation in global warming that the UNFCCC
aspires to.
The DANIDA Review made the limited funding of
CTCN their first key observation, concluding that the
underfunding and insecurity of budget due to the
voluntary nature of donations were critical issues to
be addressed. They concluded that ‘unless funds are
17
19 ibid para 83 sub-sections (a) – (c) respectively.
20 Evaluation Case Study of the CTCN 2016 (n 17) Executive
Summary, p 6, para iii.
21 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network,
Review Report, 16 May 2018, DANIDA <https://www.ctc-
n . o r g / s i t e s / w w w . c t c - n . o r g / f i l e s /
ctcn_danida_review_report_2018.pdf>.
22 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16) para 84 (a).
23 ibid Para 64 Table 5.
24 See ‘Everything you need to know about the V&A
Dundee’ BBC News (Scotland, 12 September 2018)
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-45197154>.
25 See Charlotte Becquart, ‘Millions of Pounds to be spent
on New Cycle Paths in Cornwall’ CornwallLive (1 February
2019) <https://www.cornwalllive.com/news/cornwall-
news/millions-pounds-spent-new-cycle-2564353>.
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anticipation of a cumulative total of 356-515 requests
from NDEs in the first four years of operation, and
whilst these figures were revised downwards on the
basis of successive annual operating plans to 266 –
410 over the same period, the cumulative total of
requests was only 185 over the first three and a half
years of operation, with only 105 projects completed
or under active development or delivery during this
period.32 The report is explicit that this failure to meet
target is ‘owing to an absence of demand from
countries’.33
The reasons behind this lack of demand are attributed
to shortcomings in the NDE/CTCN axis as follows:
• Lack of resources or local governance issues
preventing the NDE’s from fully delivering
their roles in originating and progressing their
requests
• Capacity building programmes to enable and
empower NDE’s to fulfil their role being
initially successful, but time limited due to
high turnover of NDE staff, thereby
requiring a rolling programme to maintain
impact
• The initial guidance from the CTCN on the
role of  NDE’s being insufficiently clear
• Longer than anticipated timelines to action
requests due to the complexity of the CTCN
structure and decision making processes and
the aforementioned limitations of resources.
Whilst only a small number of  NDE’s
interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with
the length of the process, it is not difficult
to imagine that slow response times would
negatively impact the flow of requests.
• Failures in extending the network and
communicating effectively to necessary
stakeholders to ensure greater engagement
with the technical assistance function of the
CTCN34
increased significantly, it will be difficult for CTCN to
function as the intended Global Mechanism, being
effective in facilitating the transfer, uptake and scaling
of climate technologies and ensuring learning and
impact’.26
Against this funding baseline, the achievements of
the CTCN in its early years of operation are to be
applauded. Any shortcomings in operation
subsequently discussed in this paper must in fairness
be viewed through the prism of the extremely limited
level and insecurity of funding available, but it is
nonetheless instructive to examine such limitations in
performance as may exist, in the hope that they may
be addressed should the funding situation be
appropriately enhanced in future.
Further findings of the UNFCCC Review of
performance were indeed less positive and are
discussed below. Relevant to some of  these issues,
however, is one further fact relating to the availability
of funding, namely that 44 per cent of such limited
income as there is, is earmarked against specific projects
by donors, thereby further constraining the ability of
the CTCN to align activities and expenditures with
core priorities.27
In terms of effectiveness, whilst the UNFCCC Review
did note a number of significant achievements in terms
of  operational start up, network development and
capacity building and support for NDE’s,28 it also
identified a shortfall in the number of projects
undertaken compared to projected Technical Assistance
(TA) targets.29 The DANIDA Review also raised
concerns that in 2017, the number of TA requests
actually fell compared to the previous year.30 Whilst
the Knowledge Management System and information
provision, number of training events and participants
trained all met or exceeded targets,31 the number of
technical assistance projects responded to in the first
three and a half years of operation was well below that
anticipated. Initial targets were based on the
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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26 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(n 21) Executive Summary, iii.
27 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16) para 57,14.
28 ibid paras 59 and 60.
29 ibid para 60.
30 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(n 21) 6.
31 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16) para 62, Table 3, 15.
32 ibid para 60 and Table 2, 14.
33 ibid para 62, Table 3, 15.
34 ibid paras 72-74,  18-19.
The DANIDA Review further postulated that the small
number of projects undertaken and the large number
of developing countries, meant that each country may
only have an active project with the CTCN every 5-6
years on average, making it difficult to either build
routine or maintain the engagement of such
countries.35
Whether these shortcomings are best addressed by
greater funding of the ‘business as usual’ approach or
an alternative strategy and operational model will be
discussed below, but suffice it to say for now, that
whatever approach is taken going forward, securing a
meaningful flow of technological advice and solutions
has to be a priority if the end result of achieving  a
positive  impact on climate change mitigation and
adaption is to be delivered on any meaningful scale.
This brings us conveniently to the topic of impact.
Whilst there is acknowledgement by the UNFCCC
Review of positive impacts on the broader ecosystem
of  climate change and development interventions, and
qualitative examples of programmes which will
undoubtedly bear fruit in the future, performance
against all outcome targets falls significantly short – by
an order of magnitude in some cases.36 Clearly the
longer than anticipated implementation timescale, and
limiting finances are contributing factors,37 as is the
fact that technology transfer is a complex and time
consuming process, with impacts not necessarily being
realised for some time after the role of the CTCN has
concluded. The DANIDA Review further recognised
the challenge of monitoring and evaluating impact
with many small activities over a wide range of themes
and countries.38 The UNEP review, the first conducted,
simply felt it was too early in the operational cycle to
assess depth of impact.39 That said, it is only the
achievements of quantifiable impacts on climate
resilience or reductions in carbon intensity which are
truly meaningful in terms of the raison d’etre of the
CTCN. Two points are salient here for further
consideration; firstly, that the UNFCCC Review notes
there is no monitoring or evaluation system in place
to capture such macro level impacts40 and secondly,
whether the impact targets as set out for the CTCN are
even appropriate? In the absence of the former, targets
are reduced to tick box indicators of numbers of
various activities which collectively, are arguably
indicative of ‘the right kind of things being done’ and
‘things heading in the right direction’. The underlying
assumption of this kind of evaluation is that the more
of  these things that you do, the better you must be
doing and the greater impact you must be delivering.
There are circumstances where that may be true. If the
aim of your organisation is to treat wounded soldiers,
then the more you can treat to a given standard of
care, the more lives you are likely to save. However, if
the aim of your organisation is to stop dams bursting,
it is immediately clear that preventing one dam from
bursting, if it were the Hoover dam, will have a far
greater impact than securing 20 dams on minor rivers
which power hydro turbines for individual farmers or
home owners. Few projects of  scale of  impact then
become far more meaningful than larger numbers of
minor projects. It is clear, to this author at least, that
addressing climate change should fall into the second
category of operating model at least in relation to
mitigation efforts. In this case, impact driven evaluation
metrics make more sense than bare numbers of
requests actioned.
2.1 Concluding Remarks on
Progress
Anyone with experience of the challenge of starting a
new entity, in the private, public or third sector, will
have some level of understanding of the very many
hurdles that need to be overcome to make a new
venture operational. When that new entity has a global
footprint, with a complex, multi-organisation centre
and network, limited, often ringfenced and insecure
funding and the objective of making a significant
contribution to saving the planet, it is impossible not
to feel tremendous admiration for the progress made
by the implementing team. Have they achieved all of
their targets? No. Have they made an impact of  scale?
Not yet. What they have done, is create an operating
entity against considerable odds which is making
19
35 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(n 21) iii.
36 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16) para 79 including Table 6,  19-
20.
37 ibid para 80, 20.
38 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(n 21) iv.
39 Evaluation Case Study of the CTCN 2016 (n 17) 7. 40 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16) para 81, 20.
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progress towards many of the capacity and network
building aspects that will be required to meet the future
expectations of the organisation. They have also
established technological assistance functionality to
such a level as to enable detailed performance reviews,
and to provide an evidence base of progress and
obstacles to date on which analyses such as this one
can be founded, in the hope that both can generate
recommendations or suggestions that may enhance
future operations and achievements.
3
PRACTICALITIES
Amidst the enormity of the task of operationalising
the CTCN, it is easy to lose focus on the mandate of
the Technology Mechanism of  the UNFCCC, namely
that of ‘enhancing action on climate technology
development and transfer’.41 Rimmer expressed the
view that ‘the Technology Mechanism is meant to play
a pivotal role in encouraging research, development
and diffusion of clean technologies to address climate
change mitigation and adaptation’.42 A UNFCCC
Expert Working Group anticipated that the CTCN,
the operational arm of  the Technology Mechanism,
would be ‘an important part of the UNFCCC climate
change architecture’43. The mandate agreed by the
parties in the Cancun agreement in 2010 set out the
context of these operations, requiring that;
• Technology needs must be nationally determined,
based on national needs and priorities
• Accelerated action should occur at all stages
of the technology cycle from research to
transfer and deployment and
• Parties to the agreement able to do so, should
enter into bi- or multi-lateral co-operative
actions to deliver the country-led defined
Law, Environment and Development Journal
technological needs to mitigate or adapt to
climate change.44
Prima facie, it would seem incomprehensible that this
process should be anything other than demand led.
Surely, no one is better placed to understand the climate
change technology needs than the would be recipient
country itself. However, experience tells us that it is
unwise to leave any assumption unchallenged and
there are a number of bases upon which an argument
to test this assertion may be founded. The first of
these relates to the fact that the cost of development
and transfer of the technologies will be supported by
the financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC or
contributions from donor states or the private sector,
so that the recipient state in many cases, is not
substantially bearing the full cost of the transaction.
On that basis, which of us, if asked what car we
needed, would cite the most basic option that would
get us from A to B, if  we were not paying the full cost
of the vehicle ourselves? This is not meant in any way
to impugn the integrity of less developed countries –
it is purely an observation of  human conduct which is
applicable to all. The practicality is therefore a need to
understand at what part of the process are demand
led technology specifications subject to the
differentiation between ‘best available option’ and
‘best practicable option, considering cost of delivery’
and does that role fall to the CTCN?
The UNFCCC Review indicates that responding to
Technological Assistance requests has been more time-
consuming than anticipated. Some contributing factors
have been discussed above, but in addition, the
organisation collaborates with those parties submitting
requests for Technical Assistance to ‘fine tune’ them,
but there is no indication whether this applies to the
level of technical specification.45 If not, it is hard to
imagine that there is not a stage during implementation
where the responding party or funding mechanism,
has input to at least refining the technical request to
ensure value for money in the balance of impact versus
cost.
Another relevant issue in seeking to rely solely on
demand led technology transfer is the aforementioned
20
41 Decision 1/CP.16, paras 133-129 (n 7) paragraph 117.
42 M Rimmer , ‘Beyond the Paris Agreement: Intellectual
Property, Innovation Policy and Climate Justice’ (2019)
8,7 Laws 11.
43 Expert Workshop on the Technology Mechanism
FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.2 para 39 p 11.
44 Decision 1/CP.16, paras 133-129 (n 7) paras 114-116.
45 ‘Report on the Evaluation of Proposals for Hosting the
Climate Technology Centre’ (n 14) para72, 19.
complexity of the technology transfer process itself.
There are excellent and comprehensive works, some
by UN agencies, which examine the many barriers to
international technology transfer. It is beyond the scope
of this article to revisit them all in detail, but they
cover matters such as:
• poor macroeconomic conditions associated
with uncertain stability of tariffs or subsidies,
investment risk, under-developed financial
sectors and lack of availability of capital
• Lack of manufacturers
• Poor market confidence in technical
performance
• Lack of appropriate industry standards
• Lack of technical skills in recipient industry
• Inappropriate incentivisation of carbon
energy sources
• Lack of information on partners
• High transaction costs
• Lack of supporting legal frameworks46
Whilst this list is far from exhaustive, it amply
illustrates the challenges associated with the technology
transfer process. In addition, Sullivan has previously
demonstrated that different technologies place hugely
varying requirements on the innovation systems
between which they are transferred in order for the
transfer process to succeed.47 If technology
requirements are specified in the absence of a detailed
and sophisticated understanding of what barriers may
exist to adoption, and sustainable utilisation, there is
a chance that a technological solution is requested that
would deliver 100 per cent of perceived demand for
carbon mitigation but which has only a 10 per cent
chance of successful transfer and adoption. A
completely different technological solution may be
capable of delivering lower mitigation benefits but
have a 90 per cent chance of successful long term
adoption. Less developed countries in particular may
lack appropriate expertise in the NDE or relevant
government department to make such assessments.
This rationale presents the case for such expert external
review of country specified technological needs prior
to attempted technology transfer, but it is unclear
whether the CTCN has the capacity or mandate to
fulfil such a role. This point was also raised as a concern
by the DANIDA Review which expressed the view
that isolated technology transfers undertaken in the
absence of addressing the relevant enabling factors
could have only limited impact.48
Moving along to the mandate to engage at all stages
of the technology cycle, from R and D to full
deployment post technology transfer. Once again this
seems eminently sensible. Some technology needs of
less developed country may have ‘off  the shelf ’
solutions needing little or no modification, which can
be provided by the private sector of other parties. Other
challenges may have no immediate solution and require
innovation of the highest level to meet desired technical
performance criteria. The processes necessary to procure
these are vastly different, with completely different risk
management challenges, time scales and deliverables.
As the response mechanisms of the CTCN appear to
be a standard tender process or reaching out to the
wider Network for solutions, it is not clear, especially
in the light of their financial constraints, how well
equipped they are to manage both the practical
processes and risk across such a broad spectrum of
engagement.
This leads conveniently to the third strand of the
mandate – enhancing the bi-lateral or multilateral
arrangements that will deliver the technological
solutions. Whilst the Network has an increasingly large
number of subscribers, the extent to which they are
active was a matter of  concern in the performance review.
The UNFCCC Review noted that ‘Interactions among
Network members and the engagement of local
stakeholders have been limited’ and ‘The CTCN
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48 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
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experienced difficulties in engaging the private sector’.49
Further, it was stated that ‘While the CTCN managed
to gather a sufficient number of diversified partners
within its Network, it did not manage to create a real
community. The majority of  members are not active
within the Network, providing no contribution to
the KMS and no technical assistance’ and ‘Some
Network members are dissatisfied with the commercial
opportunities and networking activities provided by
the CTCN. During the review, several interviewees
questioned the sustainability of and value added by
the Network if its level of engagement is not
increased.’50 This exemplifies the huge challenge faced
by the CTCN in trying to provide a global service, on
limited funding in the absence of a strategic framework
that prioritises either territorial or technological focus.
The importance of private sector engagement is
discussed further below in Section 6. This review
further identified that the role of the NDEs in
developed countries has not been clear.51 A lack of
understanding of the role of developed countries in
certain technology transfers was cited as a barrier by the
aforementioned IPCC report on technology transfer
nearly twenty years ago, which illustrates the necessity
of integrating prior learning in this arena into practical
operations.52
3.1 Concluding Remarks on
Practicalities
The mandate for the Technology Mechanism and
CTCN sets out three guiding principles of practical
activity which in many ways appear to be unimpeachably
sensible. Their combined effect, however, is to cast the
CTCN in a role which is both passive and strategically
unfocussed. They are to respond to an unlimited
technological range of third party requests, across the
full spectrum of development stages, and rely upon
third party interactions across the global panoply of
state and private sector actors to meet such needs.
Couched in these terms, the mandate and resulting
mission seems far less reasonable and even less
achievable. A pertinent recommendation about the
requirement for better focus was made by the DANIDA
Review which stated that ‘Currently, the CTCN
provides support to all aspects of adaptation and
mitigation, support for small as well as larger
interventions: support for readiness activities as well
as more focussed TA (Technical Assistance). This
carries a high risk of  diluting the interventions and
makes it difficult to draw replicable lessons learned’.53
4
PRIORITIES
The overriding priority of any activities pursued under
the auspices of the UNFCCC is clearly stated in Article
2 of that convention: ‘The ultimate objective of this
Convention and any related legal instruments that the
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system’.54
The logical progression of this mandate is that where
interventions intended to reduce greenhouse gas
production are limited by capacity or finance, then those
with the greatest potential for mitigation should be
prioritised. It is widely accepted that our climate is now
at a point where such mitigation is a matter of utmost
urgency.55 As a result, it is now all the more important
that scale of potential impact should be the prioritising
factor in ranking possible interventions. However, in
2013 the Advisory Board of the CTCN set out guidance
on how the organisation should prioritise which
requests to support. Seven prioritisation criteria were
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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54 See ‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change’ <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
conveng.pdf>.
55 ‘UK Government Declares Climate Change Emergency’
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additional healthcare priorities of tackling Hepatitis C
and tuberculosis, these were not adopted by MPP until
it had established and embedded its operational
model. Furthermore, even within this first clearly
defined priority area, target drugs for licensing were
divided into Levels 1-3 in terms of priority of
acquisition, depending on a combination of their
clinical priority and the scale of market/IP factors that
would otherwise present barriers to acquisition by low
and middle income countries.61 As the name of the
organisation suggests, this is not a straightforward
purchasing model of  intervention, but a model based
on technology transfer, where IP rights are secured
from patent holders and then on-licensed to generic
manufacturers to increase lower cost availability of
therapeutics in target recipient countries. This
combination of strategic clarity and priority of
acquisition has led to rapid interventions of  substantial
scale of impact. In the six years from January 2012 to
December 2017, 6.2 billion doses of medicine were
delivered via MPPs generic partners, and 553 million
$US in savings were delivered to the international
community via MPPs licenses.62
In many ways, this mirrors the ‘Want, Find, Get,
Manage’ process of open innovation or technology
acquisition utilised in the private sector by large
industrial actors such as pharmaceutical or food
companies.63 This is widely acknowledged as a well
road-tested and effective method of acquiring third
party innovation for the benefit of the adopting
company ie utilising technology transfer to fill unmet
technical need to further the interests of the
undertaking concerned. It works for industry, it clearly
works for MPP and it has the potential to work more
effectively for the CTCN. As things stand, the state
parties are determining the ‘Want’ and CTCN is
assisting with the ‘Find and Get’ on an ad hoc basis.
The question has to be asked: If CTCN determined
the ‘Want’ in the same was as the MPP, would it not
offer the potential for far greater impact than
responding to diverse ad hoc requests for technical
set out, ranging from projects that ‘promote
endogenous and most appropriate technologies and
processes’ to those that ‘promote and demonstrate
gender equality, and empowerment of  vulnerable
groups, including women and youth’.56 Whilst
intrinsically admirable, neither of these criteria, or any
of the others specified, explicitly prioritise the level of
impact on GHG mitigation as a prioritising factor.
Sullivan has previously noted the challenge UN agencies
face in seeking to resolve the tension between equity in
development and timely stabilisation of climate change,
and this is evident once again in these prioritisation
criteria.57 Given that the level of project requests has
been lower than expected, an argument could be made
that the need for prioritisation on this basis is obviated
to some extent. The failure in this line of reasoning is
that is misses the broader point – the Technology
Mechanism and the CTCN needs to maximise the
important impact that technology transfer can make
on addressing climate change. If there is a dearth of
high impact requests coming forward, then perhaps
there needs to be a strategic change in the operational
model of the organisation, from passive/responsive
to proactive, where territories, technologies or a mix of
both, are prioritised by the CTCN. This is exactly the
kind of focussed strategic approach adopted by the
Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), a UN backed
international organisation founded in 2010 ‘to increase
access to, and facilitate the development of, life-saving
medicines for low- and middle-income countries’.58
The sole strategic objective of the MPP at the outset
of operations was ‘Increasing access to HIV treatment
through strategic use of intellectual property’ driven
by an unprecedented demand for HIV medicines.59
Whilst the founding UN organisation, Unitaid,60 had
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57 K Sullivan, ‘Technology Transfer and Climate Change:
Additional Considerations for Implementation under
the UNFCCC’(2011) 7(1) Law, Environment and
Development Journal13.
58 See <https://medicinespatentpool.org/>.
59 MPP Annual Report 2010/11  <https://medicines
patentpool.org/uploads/2017/07/Medicines-Patent-Pool-
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60 Unitaid is a global health initiative hosted by the World
Health Organisation focussed on ending the world’s
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Hepatitis C epidemics.
61 ibid 24.
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assistance? In support of this approach, one might
suggest that the state parties have already iterated the
demand side of the equation by the preparation of
country specific Technology Needs Assessments.  The
UNFCCC has already undertaken the work of
generating synthesis reports that very effectively collate
the technology needs of a large group of non-Annex
I parties to the UNFCCC (that is countries not
considered to be industrialised and hence developing
or low income states). By way of example, the third
such synthesis report covering 31 non-Annex 1
countries was presented to the UNFCCC Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technical advice back in 2013,
and helpfully included the most commonly required
areas of technological need for both mitigation and
adaptation, as well as the most commonly stated
barriers to technology transfer for each of these.64
Whilst this would need to be updated and refined, it
certainly provides a reasonable evidence base on which
to make prioritisation assessments in respect of
technology transfer to these countries. What may be
far less comfortable for a UN agency, would be the
prioritisation of assistance to states where the
transferred technology would have the greatest scope
for mitigation or adaptation, which, with respect to
the former, would almost certainly be the larger
developing countries. The DANIDA Review, suggests
that due to the limited funding and consequent scope
of support the CTCN can realistically provide, it should
consider altering it’s operating modality of  operation
to, amongst other options, ‘focus on specific countries
or sectors’.65
Prioritisation sceptics may still feel that comparisons
to the private sector are inappropriate given the broader
responsibilities of  UN agencies, and that the MPP,
whilst UN-founded, operates in the healthcare space
which is fundamentally different in structure and
objectives to the environmental sphere. To address
those who may hold such perceptions, it may finally
be useful to briefly consider technology transfer under
the Montreal Protocol. The phasing out of ozone
depleting substances to save the ozone layer from
further damage and to allow it to recover, is widely
held up as an outstanding environmental success
story.66 Commentators note that this success is in part
attributable to the clearly defined nature of the
technological challenge, namely a clear priority for
technical intervention.67
4.1 Concluding Remarks on
Prioritisation
Nothing in this section is intended to question the
general utility of CTCN operations – only time and
appropriate monitoring and evaluation will determine
the added value of these activities to the international
efforts to mitigate or adapt to climate change. What is
questioned, however, is whether, on the basis of
limited funding and human resource, the current
operating model and resultant activities offer the
greatest potential impact in these respective areas.
China, India and Russia are respectively the first, third
and fourth highest global producers of greenhouse
gases.68 According to its own progress report of CTCN
performance thus far, there is no indication that it has
provided any technical assistance to any of these
countries even at the sub-national level, even though
China and India are non-Annex I countries and the
Russian Federation is an Annex I Economy in
Transition.69 Only just over 4 per cent of  the 137
received requests are for multi-country activity70
although the report explicitly recognises the benefits
of scalability of impact via multi-country requests.71
Under the current responsive model, the CTCN is
largely unable to change these limitations, but if it
64 United Nations, Third synthesis report on technology
needs identified by Parties not included in Annex I to
the Convention, FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7  <https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbsta/eng/inf07.pdf>
5-6.
65 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(n 21) Review, 17.
66 Anderson, Sarma and Taddonio (n 2)XIX.
67 I Rae, ‘Saving the Ozone Layer: Why the Montreal
Protocol Worked’ The Conversation (Australia, 9 September
2012) <https://theconversation.com/saving-the-ozone-
layer-why-the-montreal-protocol-worked-9249>.
68 ‘Each Country’s Share of  CO2 Emissions’, Union of
Concerned Scientists <https://www.ucsusa.org/global-
warming/science-and-impacts/science/each-countrys-
share-of-co2.html>.
69 CTCN Progress Report (2018) https://www.ctc-n.org/
files/resources/ctcn-ar18-book-final.pdf  >50, 55 and
60.
70 ibid  68-69.
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were to take the approach of the MPP and prioritise
technology development and acquisition, and states
or regions for implementation, still driven of course
by state determined Technology Needs Assessments,
it could have far greater control over impact than is
currently the case. The progress report already states
that a key lesson learned to date is that the measurement
and communication of impact is vital to the success
of  the CTCN.72 Surely being in a position to more
actively maximise that impact is also vital.
5
PATHWAYS
Technology transfers, both domestic and particularly
international, are not transactions which are easily
achieved. Perhaps this article should have articulated a
sixth ‘P’ for ‘Problems’ in technology transfer, but to
keep to more commonly used parlance, there are often
many so-called ‘barriers’ to both the initial transfer,
and it’s sustainable adoption and wider diffusion. Many
researchers and organisations, of which the UN and its
agencies are at the forefront, have made tremendous
progress in understanding the barriers to technology
transfer, in particular in relation to climate change
technologies.73 74 This understanding has translated
into what is often referred to as ‘capacity building’
efforts, particularly in recipient territories, in order to
reduce these perceived barriers. This addresses a very
long list of factors, many of which are articulated well
in documents already mentioned here, including
availability of finance and skills, compatible
infrastructure, technical performance requirements,
policy issues such as inappropriate incentives for high
carbon alternatives, legal framework and so on.75
Elevating skills or other interventions in capacity
building approaches seek to improve the ‘innovation
system’ of human capital, financing, networks, and
infrastructure, and the CTCN is making good progress
on this front with respect to education and training
provision in support of human capital development.76
However, there is an additional complicating factor in
play with respect to climate change technologies. Not
only are innovation systems territorially specific, they
are also industry sector specific and, in many instances,
they are technology specific as well. Climate change
technologies encompass the full breath of sectors;
energy, transport, food and agriculture, transport,
housing, waste management and health, and even
within a single sector, such as forestry, innovation needs
may range from improved forestry management
practices to genetically modified trees, which may have
completely different demands of the innovation system
into which they are transferring. On this basis it is clear
that the variety and combinations of barriers to the
transfer of the full spectrum of climate related
technologies is on a scale which can initially at least,
appear overwhelming. In the absence of  technological
or territorial focus, the only reasonable approach is to
seek to undertake generic capacity building measures –
build skills at least in policy makers and provide
information on technology and finance – which is
exactly what the CTCN has done.77
Whilst this approach is undoubtedly useful, it may
not significantly assist in removing barriers to the most
impactful mitigation or adaptation related
technologies in any specific territory. The only way to
understand the barriers that may exist to the transfer
of  any particular innovation or technology, is to
generate a transfer pathway, covering development to
transfer stage in the donor territory, the transfer itself,
then the modification (if any), adoption, diffusion
and sustained establishment in the recipient territory,
and examining the barriers or hurdles that may come
into play at any point in that life cycle. Because individual
transfer pathway mapping is not widely undertaken,
barriers which may not be encountered until late in the
life cycle are often overlooked with the result that the
transfer fails or is never utilised. Sadly, some climate
change technology transfers have fallen into this
category, with failure to address cultural or regulatory
barriers in the recipient country until lack of adoption
makes such barriers self-evident.78
72 ibid 45.
73 J Boldt and others,  ‘Overcoming Barriers to the Transfer
and Diffusion of  Climate Technologies’ (UNEP 2012).
74 Sullivan (n 47) 288-302.
75 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special
Report (n 12) Section1.5 and (n 55) 15-34.
76 ‘Report on the Evaluation of Proposals for Hosting the
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If the information on barriers is available in the
literature, perhaps the solution is to find better ways
to visualise and interpret such information, not only
to help practitioners and enablers to foresee obstacles
in time to find ways over, or innovate a way round,
but also to enable the user to make meaningful
comparisons between different options. To those of
us experienced in technology transfer, the term ‘transfer
pathway’ makes the whole process sound too easy –
quite literally like a walk in the park. In reality, it is far
more like a steeple chase – a long process with
numerous hurdles, some of which appear initially to
be insurmountable. Using this analogy, this paper
proposes a means of visualising the transfer pathway
by visually mapping the number and scale of hurdles
or barriers, and their proximity to the donor or recipient
side of the transfer. The following diagram shows a
representative transfer pathway for a generic adaptation
technology. It shows the barriers identified in the third
TNA Synthesis report for adaptation technology
transfers; economic and financial; policy, legal and
regulatory; institutional and organizational capacity;
and technical.79 The most commonly encountered
barriers are shown to be higher to reflect this.
 
 
 
DONOR        a             b                                                                c          d         e            f        RECIPIENT 
Fig. 1. The transfer pathway shows access to finance
and technical issues as barriers for both supply and
demand side actors (a and c and b and d respectively)
whereas organisational capacity/infrastructure and legal
issues (e and f respectively) as relevant to the recipient
territory only.
This hypothetical example shows that barriers such as
finance or technical standards issues can present a barrier
on the supply as well as demand side and in some
instances a domestic ‘fix’ to overcome the donor side
barrier may be required in addition to an international
community intervention on the recipient side of  the
transfer. If the supply side company is an SME, for
example, they may be unable to accept the financial risk
of slow or non-payment and need a domestic
government indemnification such as the Export Loan
Guarantee Scheme run in the UK to overcome that
barrier. Alternatively, they may need investment to scale
up to meet increased demand. This is a completely
different type of financial barrier and solution to that
experienced on the demand side of the equation where
financial support from the international community
may be required to offset costs of acquisition in whole
or in part. Once again, the IPCC report nearly two
decades ago, was explicit on the fact that supply side
barriers in developed countries should not be
overlooked and were particularly relevant to
SMEs.80 Even on such a very simplistic level, this
visualisation approach makes the appreciation of the
number, scale and the effective ‘ownership’ of barriers
far easier to grasp. Whilst the Technology Needs
synthesis report quite rightly suggests a barrier analysis
for each technology, with identification of  ‘enablers’
for each, within each country, the implication is that
barriers are all demand side based.81 As noted above,
this is not necessarily true, and it is important that at
the domestic level in technology supply side countries,
an assessment is made of barriers to technology
transfer and appropriate policies or interventions
implemented to reduce or obviate these. This would
appear to be a natural role for the NDEs.
If this approach may have utility for demonstration
purposes, is that necessarily transferable to real world
transfers? As previously mentioned, technology
transfer under the Montreal Protocol to reduce levels
of  ozone depleting substances (ODS’s) was a
remarkably successful example of environmental
technology transfer, and it provides very helpful
demonstrators of the potential utility of this type of
visualisation. It demonstrates that the first wave of
79 FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7 (n 64) para 12,6.
80 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special
Report (n 12) Section 1.5.
81 FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7 (n 64) Table 1,5.
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innovation and technology transfer occurred within
developed countries, with uncertainty about regulatory
and private sector (eg insurance industry) standards
being a principal barrier along with securing appropriate
technological performance of alternatives.82 This can
be illustrated by the following pathway profile.
 
 
 
DONOR         a                                                                              b                                              RECIPIENT 
Fig 2a. This illustrates the early principal barriers to
transfer. Despite involvement of the US Military
research infrastructure, as well as global public and
private sector research, the technical barriers were
challenging (a) and massive international efforts were
needed to identify replacement compounds for ODSs.
Even when such compounds were developed, a
significant barrier to their adoption was that of
regulatory standards lagging behind, so that the use
of the new compounds was not reflected in legal
standards required of manufacturers (b).
Subsequent transfer of ODS alternatives to countries
with economies in transition (CEIT’s) identified a
completely different profile of barriers. Analysis of
over a thousand completed technology transfers under
the Montreal Protocol revealed that barriers to
technology transfer in CEITs were experienced in a
number of categories.83 Even though these barriers
are not ranked, when visualised below, it becomes
instantly clear that the transfer process is completely
different at this stage.
Fig 2b. This shows the transfer pathway for exactly the
same technology, but at this stage of  the process, the
profile is completely different with multiple barriers
experienced on the demand side including poor
infrastructure and utilities (a) poor regulatory standards
and implementation (b), skills shortage (c), weak
supporting industry, for example, components
production (d) cumbersome financing and high cost
of agreements (e).
This emphasises the need to examine the whole life
cycle of innovation development, transfer and
diffusion to ensure that the most appropriate
technological solutions flow as effectively as possible
to their required point of use.
82 Anderson, Sarma and Taddonio (n 2) 45.
83 ibid 257.
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5.1 Concluding Remarks on
Transfer Pathway Analysis
There are two basic points to be made on this topic.
The first is that each innovation and transfer pathway
is highly individual, potentially with multiple transfers
occurring between different public and private sector
actors as well as different territories, possibly in
differing stages of development. Each of those
transfer stages may face very different profiles of
potential barriers, and the better they are understood,
the greater the chance of adopting strategies to
27
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overcome or circumvent them and achieve efficient and
successful transfers. Transfer pathway mapping to
identify and quantify those barriers, particularly with
tools to assist visualisation of what is often a complex
process can only help enablers and policy makers to
apply their interventions more effectively. It may also
assist in making comparisons regarding the potential
ease of transfer of competing options. This leads
appropriately into the second point, which is that
things are not always as difficult as they look. The
same article that identified the numerous observed
barriers to transfer of  ODS technology to CEITs
above, stated that ‘It should be noted that many
projects were executed without problems, and this
study relates only to the projects that mentioned
specific problems in their completion reports’.84 The
fact that each transfer is individual, does not mean
that many elements of challenge are without parallel,
and transferability of learning is still hugely important.
Research into the ‘without a hitch’ projects should
progress in parallel with the considerable efforts made
to understand the barriers and ways to address them,
in those transfers that progress less effectively.
Additionally, such research should not overlook the
supply side barriers which may be addressed at
domestic level to stimulate the willingness and ability
to engage in international technology transfer.
6
PRIVATE SECTOR
Sullivan has previously highlighted the disconnect
between the facts that whilst states are the signatories
to multilateral environmental agreements such as the
UNFCCC, and hence the actors making the
commitments to technology transfers, the majority
of technologies are owned or controlled by the private
sector.85 As such, the role of organisations such as
the CTCN must be to actively engage the private sector
and the role of the state parties whose private sectors
will act as technology donors is to implement policies
or public sector support which will incentivise
companies to give effect to their technology transfer
commitments. There is a long history of such
interventions; early regulatory approaches were criticised
for having the opposite of the intended effect and
actually inhibiting technology transfers and so were
replaced by market-based approaches.86 Whilst this is
showing more promising results for some
technologies, the OECD has concerns that it may not
be a broadly advantageous approach in the field of
environmentally sustainable technologies as the latter
is aimed at delivering environmental impact rather than
fulfilling an unmet market demand – essentially
delivering a public good, albeit a much needed one.
Their view is therefore that public funding may be
essential in stimulating the necessary research and
development and subsequent transfers by the private
sector.87 The result is that whilst it is accepted that the
private sector is key to delivering climate technology
transfers, there is still debate about how to do this
most effectively which makes it an even greater challenge
for entities such as the CTCN.
The UNFCCC Review stated that ‘The private sector
appears as a critical partner for the CTCN with regards
to developing an enabling environment for climate
technology development and transfer and in particular
with regards to enabling the scaling up of climate
technologies’.88 It went on to express concern,
however, that whilst the CTC had attracted a number
of private sector members to the network (some 40
per cent of membership at that time), the feedback
from those interviewed was that there had been
insufficient engagement with the private sector or
industry involvement in the operations and activities
of  the CTCN.89 The DANIDA Review was even
harsher in it’s criticism on this point. It not only rated
the level of private sector involvement as ‘currently
weak’ but also raised the issue of the need to address
the different roles of the private sector as ‘technology
provider, technology user, investor and possibly
potential funder of climate technology transfer
solutions’.90 They went on to say that whilst there
was significant focus on the role of  the NDE’s, they
84 ibid.
85 Sullivan (n 57) 14-15.
86 Anderson, Sarma and Taddonio (n 2) 8-9.
87 ibid.
88 FCCC/CP/2017/3 (n 16)para 29, 50.
89 ibid para 29, 51
90 Review of  the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(n 21) iii.
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may not have sufficient technical knowledge or
landscape awareness to ensure a successful outcome,
whereas the project owner should have such capability
and should be a the centre of technology transfer
programmes.91 In many instances the project owner
will be from the private sector, as the owner or
controller of the technology to be transferred, or as
the primary recipient.
This issue is further complicated by the long-standing
debate around whether conventional technology
transfer from foreign companies to developing
countries is an appropriate or successful approach.
Ockwell et al propose that ‘Building up eco-innovation
capabilities in developing countries requires a shift away
from the current focus on large project based
approaches which emphasise the transfer of the
hardware aspects of clean technologies, towards
approaches that emphasise flows of codified
knowledge (know-how and know-why) and tacit
knowledge’.92 This sits uncomfortably with the
findings of earlier empirical studies which identify trade
and foreign direct investment (FDI) as primary routes
of international technology diffusion.93 More recent
work by Pueyo and Linares used quantitative analysis
to generate helpful insights into this topic and
demonstrated that when it comes to renewable
technology transfer to developing countries, one size
does not fit all.94 Analysis of a number of enabling
factors amongst technology recipient countries
identified four groupings or categories of country:
• Technology Developers
Countries such as India, China, Mexico, Brazil
and Thailand that are able to attract inward
transfers of  foreign technology, operate and
maintain the equipment and use the knowledge
gained to drive endogeneous innovation
• Technology Implementers
Countries such as Jordan, Tunisia, Panama
and Lebanon that are small economies with
low levels of fossil fuel production so that
demand side pull is strong. However, the
lack of scale hampers the ‘learning by doing’
driver of internal innovation, although the
relatively high income per capita still drives
foreign transfers of clean technologies which
the domestic industry base is capable of
implementing
• Structural Changes
Large countries such as Russia, Algeria, Egypt
and Oman with abundant domestic fossil
fuel supplies, need structural changes to
elevate the demand side pull for clean
technologies over cheap domestic carbon
based fuels. Additionally, their economies do
not provide conducive environments for
private investment.
• Aid Recipients
Countries such as Bangladesh, Honduras,
Kenya and Madagascar need foreign aid to
create the basic conditions for successful
technology transfers. This group lacks the
technological capacity to implement foreign
technologies or to develop their own. Some
countries in this group show scarcity-induced
innovation within local communities,
however, which needs to be nurtured at
grassroots level.
This analysis goes a long way towards resolving the
apparent discord between the proponents of widely
different roles for the private sector in giving effect to
technology transfers to developing countries and
shows there is not ‘right or wrong’, but simply ‘horses
for courses’. This piece of research also provides a
stark demonstration of the very different capacity
building measures and public policy interventions
needed to support and incentivise technology transfer
in each category of  recipient country.95 There is recognition
91 ibid
92 D Ockwell and others, ’Enhancing Developing Country
Access to Eco-Innovation: the Case of  Technology
Transfer and Climate Change in a Post-2012 Policy
Framework’ (2010) OECD Environmental Paper 12
< h t t p s : / / w w w. o e c d - i l i b r a r y. o r g / d o c s e r v e r /
5kmfp lm8xx f5 - en .pd f ? e xp i r e s=1563286736&id
= i d & a c c n a m e = g u e s t & c h e c k s u m = B
F5B4CA1921FB34384524225A0B87F51>.
93 W Keller,  ‘International Technology Diffusion’ (2004)
42(3) J Economic Literature 752-782.
94 A Pueyo and P Linares,  ‘Renewable Technology Transfer
to Developing Countries: One Size Does Not Fit All’
(2012) Institute of  Development Studies Working Paper
412. https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/renewable-
technology-transfer-to-developing-countries-one-size-
does-not-fit-all/. 95 ibid  25-27.
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that some countries in the Structural Change and Aid
Recipient groups do not provide environments that
inspire confidence in the private sector: that the
increased levels of risk act as a supply side barrier to
FDI for example. Sullivan has previously
recommended the use of the insurance asset by
technology transfer donor side countries as a possible
policy intervention to underwrite risks such as political
instability or IPR abuse in the recipient country, in
order to incentivise domestic industry to give effect to
international technology transfer commitments.96 This
point has been touched on by Pueyo and Linares with
respect to the private sector need to rely on long term
stability of regulatory environment in technology
recipient countries. Specifically, they suggest that
guarantees by international insurance entities could
provide comfort in respect of commercial reliance on
things like long term power purchase agreements.97
6.1 Concluding Remarks on the
Private Sector
There is a clear evidence from both reviews of CTCN
performance and from the broader literature on
International technology transfer, that there needs to
be greater private sector engagement in the operation
of the CTCN and particularly in giving effect to the
technology transfers of scale required to make a
meaningful impact on climate change mitigation and
adaptation. As mentioned previously, incentivising such
private sector engagement and mitigating any associated
business risks, will require supply and demand side
public policy interventions and demand side capacity
building measures which are both technology specific
and target country specific. This re-enforces previous
calls for a greater degree of prioritisation of both
technologies and recipient countries.
7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Evidence indicates that despite the usual challenges of
any start-up undertaking, significant organisational
complexity and limited financing, the CTCN has made
demonstrable progress in implementing its mandate
as the operational arm of  the Technology Mechanism
of the UNFCCC. Those individuals and organisations
behind this progress should be heartened by the
outcomes of their combined efforts, the positive
aspects of which have been recognised in several
reviews, in addition to the UNFCCC review referenced
most widely in this paper. These reviews have also
delivered a series of recommendations for improving
the efficiency and effectiveness of future operations
and these are helpfully summarised and responded to
by the CTCN in a single document.98 The ten
recommendations include the standard fare for such
reviews; the need for improved awareness raising of
CTCN activities and NDE function, enhanced
governance and transparency, strengthening Network
engagement and of course, several relate to various
aspects of the financing and the need to identify
additional sources of secure financial support. Of
particular relevance to this article is the need to increase
the efficiency of  the CTCN’s provision of  Technical
Assistance (Recommendation 6). In responding to
this point, the CTCN indicate adoption of a regional
approach to deliver higher impact, and the adoption
of ‘priority themes’ allowing replication among
countries with common needs. Whilst this approach
still falls short of the active strategic priority/
procurement model advocated in this paper, it could
certainly be viewed as movement in that direction.
An examination of the mandate of the CTCN and
the practicalities this imposes on the operations of
the organisation, has revealed that it was structured in
such a way as to inevitably cast the organisation in a
purely responsive mode in terms of its technical
assistance role. There is evidence above of a recognition
of the need for greater impact and efficiency in this
aspect of operations and perhaps it is time to review
the mandate accordingly. The practice of  open
innovation in industry, and the operating model of
the Medicines Patent Pool, a UN founded international
organisation, both point to a ‘want, find, get, manage’
active procurement model. Whilst the ‘want’ is initially
specified in state parties Technology Needs Assessment
and associated action plans, there could be a role for
96 Sullivan (n 47) 300.
97 Pueyo and Linares (n 94) 28.
98 CTCN Response to Review Recommendations October
2018 < https://www.ctc-n.org/sites/www.ctc-n.org/files
/item_7_-_ctcn_response_to_recommendations.pdf>.
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the CTCN in identifying commonly required, high
impact technologies and the best practicable option
for meeting identified needs. The ‘best practicable
option’ approach can assess all relevant categories of
risk as well as value for money considerations. Such
prioritisation of a small number of technologies
would allow far greater evaluation of the technology
transfer pathway for high priority recipient states,
ensuring that specific barriers can be identified and
addressed via targeted capacity building measures. This
is essential if the barriers to large scale private sector
engagement are to be addressed. Such focus also allows
the bandwidth to apply the extensive knowledge and
previous experience of the UN agencies and their
partners with respect to technology transfer, to more
projects of scale.
The knowledge of barriers to technology transfer,
both generically and in respect of specific technologies
is extensive but challenging to apply anew with every
technology transfer attempted. Tools to visualise the
barriers, in terms of their number, nature and
proximity to supplier or recipient is a potentially useful
approach to ensuring that these matters are
meaningfully and timeously considered. Software tools
to generate such pathway schematics could easily be
constructed to suggest barrier options relevant to
specific technology sectors, as well as being
underpinned by a database that would suggest enablers
or mechanisms via which they have been historically
and successfully addressed. Even the very basic
schematics illustrated in this article serve as a useful
reminder that barriers are not always on the demand
side and a useful role for developed country NDEs
could be ensuring that where they are acting as the
supply side of technology transfers, all domestic
endeavours have been made to ensure that any such
barriers are addressed by national policies or public
sector interventions where necessary.
Whilst this paper advocates consideration of a change
in strategic focus and operating mandate, it will
inevitably be hampered by limiting funding, if that
issue remains unresolved. However, if the centrality
of technology transfer to addressing climate change
mitigation and adaptation is better acknowledged by
the international community and a more appropriate
level of secure funding is achieved, there is no reason
why a strategic focus on CTCN led technology
acquisitions cannot operate alongside the generic,
responsive activities undertaken to date, thereby
ensuring the widest impact of both approaches. There
is a time pressure to achieve this, however, not simply
due to the pressing nature of addressing climate
change, but due to the fact that the limited scale of
operations and potential impact to date is clearly causing
concern: Rimmer reported that in response to such
perceived limitations ‘there has been consideration of
alternative mechanisms for technology transfer’. He
further stated that despite declarations at the Bonn
Climate Conference in 2017 aimed at enhancing
technology development and transfer via the
Technology Mechanism, developing countries
remained unsatisfied that this matter was appropriately
resolved.99 Urgent progress is therefore needed on
reviewing the mandate and associated practicalities of
operation of  the CTCN, allowing prioritisation of
technologies and target countries for technology
transfers. This will allow for greater focus on the transfer
pathways for the chosen technologies, and more
targeted capacity building or policy interventions to
incentivise more wholesale engagement of the private
sector. Addressing the 5 ‘P’s’ will increase the potential
for the CTCN to make a greater contribution to the
global technological response to climate change
mitigation and adaptation, but only continued
monitoring and evaluation will determine whether this
entity occupies nothing more than a niche role in
climate technology transfer or evolves to be at the
forefront of international transfer and adoption of
the technological responses to climate change.
99 Rimmer (n 42) 9.
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